UNSC then UNGA - How does it make sense?

Despite a disheartening failure at the Security Council, the League of Arab States has preferred not to give up. They're now before the UN General Assembly with the same demand of deposition for President Assad, and this time the way doesn't seem as hopeless as it was at UNSC. The much popular "double veto" though became one of the trending topics everywhere, was quite anticipated much before the voting process. But, this time the things are very much different. It's UNGA, no veto and an obvious support of the majority, which has made the passage of the resolution almost certain.

Although, the move holds complete procedural validity. It has been brought under Article 11(2) of the UN Charter which empowers the General Assembly to look into any matter pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security, my doubt lies on the importance and effectiveness of the move. I've two questions:-

Does this move has the ability to make the change happen?
Can there be a substantive culmination of this resolution?
Let's evaluate the above two doubts raised on the merits of the provisions prescribed under the UN Charter.

Article 11(2) through which the resolution has been brought up itself doesn't bestow a conclusive character to the resolutions passed in the assembly. The article goes like this,
"The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion."

So, going by the highlighted words, UNGA is impotent to bring about a conclusive decision without the final affirmation of the UNSC, which means that despite the passage of the resolution in the General Assembly, it doesn't obtain any substance to cheer about. It's bound to go through another discourse of disparity in the UNSC which has already shown disinterest in averring it once. We've our first question answered here. The General Assembly doesn't have any absolute ability to make the change happen.

Now, the second question requires a re-examination of the prevailing conditions. As it has already been shown that the resolution will be moving down the UNSC again, a successful culmination of the resolution is completely contingent upon the change of the stances of the dissenting countries.

The statement of the Russian Permanent Mission to the UN as recorded after the vote in the Syrian resolution avowed its confidence in the ability of Syria to forge a political settlement, which was equivocally supported by the Chinese ambassador. The statements have seen no change since then. Both the countries are still on the same track, though criticizing the turbulence but imparting confidence in the recovery of political stability without the sanctions. This has got us very close to the answer for the second question, which is another episode of the no-hoper resolution. It's destined to fail again and no diplomatic efforts seem able enough to stop this fall.

This whole affair comprehensively stinks as a waste. Diplomacy isn't a mere thing to be practiced, it always carries an aim, an end which it targets to achieve. In this case, the efforts themselves have fallen short of credibility. They seem to be going nowhere, but still international press has got a lot to report, and so is it doing, appreciating the step and scathing the conditions of the country.